Can antitrust law protect big companies as well as small companies and consumers?

An increasing number of large companies are discovering – as plaintiffs – that the answer is yes.

Many practitioners ascribe to the following paradigm: Antitrust enforcement is an anathema to large companies.  They point to the fact that big companies, like Microsoft, AT&T and Verizon, have repeatedly fought private plaintiffs and antitrust enforcers as defendants/respondents in civil antitrust proceedings.  But if antitrust enforcement represents inefficient, costly and intrusive forays into nullifying acts taken in an otherwise “free market,” why are these same large companies now seeking the assistance of antitrust enforcement?

Microsoft bitterly complains about Google’s dominance in Internet search, and phone companies balk at the market power of cable providers when they challenge them in video-programming and broadband markets.  One can imagine that these big company complainants, who formerly argued that plaintiffs had to satisfy high evidentiary thresholds to succeed in a monopoly maintenance or attempted monopoly case, are now revisiting that position.

Is this ironic?  Should any complaints by these large companies be given any credence in light of these companies’ former hostility to enforcement?  One would think that they should be given the same consideration as any other antitrust complaint.  If these complaints raise facts and economic theories that are consistent with the pro-consumer rationale at the heart of the Sherman Act, enforcers should act upon them.

Practitioners that specialize in antitrust enforcement may find large companies to be unlikely allies, yet still welcome their efforts to act as private attorneys general in the arena of antitrust enforcement, particularly as government enforcement efforts may be constrained in the future by our nation’s large deficit.

St. Vincent’s Hospital in Manhattan may have survived its recent brush with possible monopolization, but its financial health leaves it susceptible to relapse.  That’s the diagnosis of some antitrust practitioners, who are bracing for another outbreak.

The weak financial health of St. Vincent’s Hospital has been in the news lately.  News reports indicate that St. Vincent’s, located on Manhattan’s West 12th Street, is again having difficultly meeting its financial obligations.  (St. Vincent’s is no stranger to the bankruptcy process, having gone through a Chapter 11 proceeding in 2005.)

One proposal would have shored up St. Vincent’s financial position by reducing health services and competition.  Continuum Health Care Partners – a health care consortium that operates three Manhattan hospitals, including Roosevelt Hospital (at W. 55th Street), St. Luke’s Hospital (at W. 114th Street) and Beth Israel Medical Center (at E. 16th Street) – proposed acquiring St. Vincent’s and turning it into a strictly outpatient facility.  In other words, Continuum stated that it would shut down St. Vincent’s inpatient, emergency services facility if it were to operate St. Vincent’s. click here for more »

The U.S. Department of Justice is weighing whether to pursue an investigation into the legality of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) Bowl Championship Series (“BCS”), which critics contend unfairly excludes smaller universities from the national football title.

Senator Orrin Hatch raised the issue in a letter to the Justice Department in October 2009 in which he complained that the BCS system is an artificial market barrier against smaller schools. Assistant Attorney General Ronald Weich has now responded to Senator Hatch in a letter that the DOJ is considering such a probe into “the current lack of a college football national championship playoff” because it “raises important questions affecting millions of fans, colleges and universities, players and other interested parties.”

Federal antitrust enforcers are signaling that they don’t want merger enforcement to be the butt of the classic joke about the shipwrecked economist who solves the problem of how to open a can of soup by assuming a can opener.  Merger justifications that assume hypothetical competitors would block anticompetitive effects may not pass the laugh test under new Merger Guidelines.

Antitrust enforcers are likely to give greater weight to real-world competitive harm than to theoretical assumptions, according to Christine Varney, Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, who made concluding remarks last week on the completion of two months of workshops on revising the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines.

It is likely that this effort will lead to a significant revision of the Merger Guidelines. Due to the Guidelines’ persuasive influence on jurists, the courts’ approach to mergers is also likely to change.

AAG Varney cited the following “gaps” between the Guidelines and actual agency practice:

• “[D]efining markets and measuring market shares may not always be the most effective starting point for many types of merger reviews. . . . When it is clear, for instance, that either certain vulnerable customers are likely to be harmed by a merger . . . the need to define a market to assess likely competitive effects is diminished.”

• “[T]he Guidelines overstate the importance of HHIs in merger analysis . . . Revising the HHI thresholds to express accurately how the Agencies use HHIs seems not just appropriate but also necessary to correct what has become an affirmative misstatement at this point.”

• The Guidelines do not explain fully the agencies’ tools of economic analysis, such as sales diversion ratios, price-cost margins, customer win-loss reports, and the views of competitors, customers, and other industry observers.

AAG Varney’s comments echoed lessons learned from the financial markets’ collapse in 2008.  She noted that:  “Theoretical assumptions that market forces naturally and inevitably correct for market failures clearly need to be reconsidered.  In the context of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the most relevant aspect of this reassessment involves explicit or implicit assumptions that entry will erode market power otherwise enhanced by a merger.”

Although Ticketmaster’s got a ticket to ride with its merger target, Live Nation, the ticket vendor is finding that the price of a ticket for a merger has gone up in the Obama Administration.

The Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice forced Ticketmaster this week to take actions to achieve antitrust clearance of its merger with Live Nation.  Among other things, Ticketmaster was compelled to license its intellectual property to a competitor for five years as a condition for deal approval.

Ticketmaster, the largest vendor in primary ticketing, sought to merge with Live Nation, a small competitor in primary ticket vending and the largest concert promoter in the U.S.  The Division determined that the merger would have substantially lessened competition in primary ticket sales by resulting in higher ticket prices for events.

To remedy this likely competitive harm, the Division caused Ticketmaster to divest one of its subsidiaries and to provide that subsidiary (as an independent competitor) with the ability to utilize Ticketmaster’s “host” primary ticketing electronic platform.  As a result, this new competitor will be able to offer consumers the same sophisticated e-ticket technology offered by the dominant, merged entity on a substantial scale. click here for more »