On August 19, 2010 – after 18 years, including a year-long revision process – the DOJ and FTC finally released a new – and kinder, gentler – version of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.

The Guidelines, originally adopted in 1968 and previously revised in 1992, “outline the principal analytical techniques, practices and the enforcement policy of the [DOJ and FTC] with respect to mergers . . . involving actual or potential competitors . . . under the antitrust laws.”  

The revision process, started in September 2009, involved a series of workshops, public comment and proposed refinements.  The result is a set of revamped Guidelines that differ from the 1992 version in several ways.  In general, they reflect a more tolerant approach to mergers, stressing the need to “avoid unnecessary interference with . . . competitively beneficial” mergers; raising the concentration thresholds (HHI’s) that warrant further scrutiny of a merger; and explicitly clarifying that coordinated effects can, in fact, be legal.    

The revised guidelines also include several new features.   One, “Evidence of Adverse Competitive Effects,” identifies evidence helpful in evaluating mergers.  It includes effects of consummated mergers; direct comparisons to events such as mergers, exit, expansion or entry that have occurred in the relevant market; competition between the merging firms; and a merger’s impact on “disruptive” firms that benefit consumers, e.g., through price cutting or innovation.  Other additions include discussions of how the agencies evaluate monopsony power, mergers of competing buyers, and partial acquisitions. 

The 2010 Merger Guidelines replace the 1992 Guidelines.  They do not, however, replace the agencies’ Commentary on the Guidelines issued in 2006.  Nor do they replace the Bank Merger Competitive Review guidelines developed in 1995.

New antitrust immunity for old media is one of the options discussed by the FTC staff in its recently released Discussion Draft on proposals to support “reinventing” journalism.  The Draft is part of a project begun in May 2009 to consider the challenges faced by journalism in the digital age.

After reciting well-known statistics about the broad decline of print media (revenue declines, staffing cuts, the proliferation of competing new media), the Draft discussed proposals for two antitrust exemptions aimed at supporting the newspaper industry.

One proposal would allow news organizations to collaborate in erecting “pay walls” that would require consumers to pay for online content.  This proposal is based on the notion that pay walls simply won’t be effective unless they are erected “industry-wide.”  Similarly, the second proposal would allow news organizations to jointly agree on ways to get news aggregators – i.e., Google and other search engines and news services – to pay for the use of online content.

While the Draft reviews both the pros and cons of each proposal, the tone is lukewarm.  Despite some calls for legislation to allow news organizations to experiment with “innovative content distribution and cost saving arrangements,” the Draft acknowledges that these calls have largely dissipated.

Similarly, Congress’s previous experiment with antitrust immunity in the newspaper business, the 1970 Newspaper Preservation Act aimed at allowing coordination between competing newspapers in certain markets, was widely criticized as unsuccessful.

The Draft also acknowledges some compelling comments in opposition to the proposals.  These include the observation that easing the antitrust laws would put small, emerging media companies at a disadvantage.  Barriers to entry into media have never been lower, and the likely beneficiaries of the proposals might just turn out to be the already highly-consolidated, old-media news publishers.  Perhaps most powerful in opposition to the proposals is the report that at least two existing collaborations have been reviewed by the DOJ (one concerning tracking online content, the other platforms for monetizing news content) and deemed to pass muster under the antitrust laws.

Last week Google recently released its own comments on the workshop and the Draft, arguing that the problems of the news industry are “business problems, not legal problems.”  Google insists that it sends 4 billion clicks per month to news publishers, and it is up to the publishers to decide how to interact with (and monetize) those visitors.  Google called on news organizations to work within the antitrust laws to create payment schemes to benefit from their online content without price-fixing, “rather than seeking immunity for anticompetitive behavior.”

More than a decade after British Airlines and American Airlines first sought antitrust immunity for their global alliance, the U.S. Department of Transportation last week granted their request.

The immunity allows the members of the so-called Oneworld Alliance – including British Airlines, American Airlines, and Iberia of Spain – to coordinate on prices, capacity, and service.  The U.S. approval follows on the heels of a similar grant from the European Commission the week before.

Both the U.S. and the E.U. have conditioned immunity on the Oneworld Alliance members’ giving up coveted takeoff and landing positions at Heathrow airport for flights departing to the United States.  But the airlines seem to believe that this sacrifice will be worth the advantage they will gain from partnering with one another.  The Oneworld Alliance will compete against two other global competitors that already have antitrust immunity – Star Alliance (made up of Lufthansa and United/Continental, who have announced a merger) and SkyTeam (made up of Delta Air Lines and Air France-KLM.)

These global partnerships are changing the face of airline competition.  Rather than one airline competing against the others serving the same region, these global alliances will compete against one another.  This will particularly impact corporate travel buyers, who tend to negotiate with the alliances.  Proponents of these ventures argue that forging an alliance, and gaining global reach, keeps the airlines competitive with what business travelers need.

Of course, this means that airlines left without global partners may be at a distinct disadvantage, as critics of the U.S. and E.U.’s actions would be quick to point out.  Virgin Atlantic’s Richard Branson, for example, has been an outspoken critic of the Oneworld Alliance.  Virgin Atlantic has no global partners.

SmithKline Beecham Corp. may be breathing a little easier for now as a result of a temporary denial of class certification in the antitrust litigation that seeks to hold the pharmaceutical company liable for delaying generic versions of the nasal spray Flonase.

Judge Anita B. Brody of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ordered the plaintiffs to rebrief their motion by September 30 in light of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit’s ruling a day earlier in a price-fixing class action against diamond company De Beers SA.

A day before Judge Brody’s ruling, the Third Circuit vacated a $295 million settlement in the De Beers case, Sullivan v. DB Investments Inc.  The Third Circuit held that the district court failed to properly ascertain whether class certification was appropriate.  In vacating the De Beers settlement, the appeals court found that the lower court had not addressed differences among the state laws at issue in the case.

The De Beers ruling could have significant implications for the plaintiffs in the Flonase antitrust litigation because they are seeking the certification of multiple classes based on various state and federal laws.  Each of the potential classes seeks to represent individuals and entities that purchased Flonase or its generic equivalent from May 19, 2004, until the full effects of generic competition had been felt.

The court had previously allowed the plaintiffs to proceed with allegations that Glaxo SmithKline (formed by the merger of Glaxo Wellcome and SmithKline Beecham in 2000) caused them to overpay for Flonase by repeatedly filing sham citizen petitions that stalled the entry of generic nasal sprays into the market.  Citizen petitions can be filed with the FDA while approval of a generic drug is pending to express concerns about a product or request that the FDA take administrative action.  Congress passed a law in 2007 permitting the FDA to summarily dismiss citizen petitions to stop drug companies from abusing the process to extend monopolies.

Judge Brody’s ruling temporarily denying class certification may turn out to be only a hiccup in plaintiffs’ quest for class certification.  That said, in seeking class certification, the plaintiffs will need to fully address the differences among the various state and federal laws at issue or risk certification being denied yet again.  Until they achieve the requested class certification, it is the plaintiffs who cannot breath easy.

While no one may be predicting China will be the antitrust powerhouse of the 21st Century, its days as an antitrust neophyte appear to be ending.

China’s National Development and Reform Commission (“NDRC”) of China has levied fines and administrative penalties against more than 20 producers of rice noodles.  This enforcement action represents the first application of Article 13 of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law against a price-fixing cartel.  According to media reports, the local Guangxi counterpart of the NRDC led the enforcement efforts.

The cartel involved competing rice noodle producers in the cities of Nanning and Liuzhou.  The first cartel began in November of 2009 in the city of Nanning and continued until January 2010.  During that time, competitors held a series of meetings that led 18 noodle producers to agree to increase prices of rice noodles. Soon thereafter, a second cartel formed in the nearby city of Liuzhou that lead 15 noodle producers to reach agreement to raise prices.  After consumer protests, the NRDC began its investigation, which eventually resulted in publication of China’s first public infringement decision under the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law on March 30, 2010. 

The fines ranged from 100,000 RMB (approximately $14,700 U.S. dollars) to 800,000 RMB (approximately $117,800 U.S. dollars).  Reports have also indicated that some producers took advantage of China’s leniency program and only received warnings.  China’s Price Law also played a role as local enforcement agencies restored rice noodle prices to pre-cartel levels.